What CISOs need to learn from WannaCry

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In 2017 — for the first time in over a decade — a computer worm ran rampage across the internet, threatening to disrupt businesses, industries, governments and national infrastructure across several continents.

The WannaCry ransomware attack became the biggest threat to the internet since the Mydoom worm in 2004. On May 12, 2017, the worm infected millions of computers, encrypting their files and holding them hostage to a bitcoin payment.

Train stations, government departments, and Fortune 500 companies were hit by the surprise attack. The U.K.’s National Health Service (NHS) was one of the biggest organizations hit, forcing doctors to turn patients away and emergency rooms to close(https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/nhs-cyber-attack-hack-hospitals-16-patients-turned-away-wanna-decryptor-a7733196.html).

Earlier this week we reported a deep-dive story(https://techcrunch.com/2019/07/08/the-wannacry-sinkhole/) into the 2017 cyberattack that’s never been told before.

British security researchers — Marcus Hutchins and Jamie Hankins — registered a domain name found in WannaCry’s code in order to track the infection. It took them three hours to realize they had inadvertently stopped the attack dead in its tracks. That domain became the now-infamous “kill switch” that instantly stopped the spread of the ransomware.

As long as the kill switch remains online, no computer infected with WannaCry would have its files encrypted.

But

<https://contacted.org/2019/07/what-cisos-need-to-learn-from-wannacry/>;